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Abstract 
Energy industry codes set the rules for a large range of practices in gas and electricity networks 
and markets. They are a key but often overlooked element in the governance of energy. 
Crucially, for any aspect of energy policy to function well in practice, the relevant codes must be 
aligned with that policy. Central to this issue is code governance; i.e. the arrangements for 
changing or modifying codes. While Ofgem has a final veto, and can suggest where there is a 
need to make major changes to reflect new policies, the process of governing codes still lies 
primarily with the industry itself. It has long been recognised that there are a number of problems 
with the code governance system. One is the complexity and fragmentation of both codes 
themselves and the code governance process, which deter market entry and participation by 
smaller actors in the governance system. A second, related, issue is the dominance of incumbents 
on code panels and working groups. A third problem is a lack of fit between code objectives and 
wider policy objectives. Overall, the concern is that codes deter innovation. These problems 
inspired Ofgem’s 2008 Code Governance Review, but they have nevertheless persisted. Further 
reforms are being adopted under the CMA’s energy markets investigation and a further Ofgem 
review. However, these reforms remain piecemeal and incremental, and do not engage with the 
fundamental principle underlying code governance, which can be seen as one of ‘self-authored 
regulation’. This principle was designed to reduce regulatory risk and problems arising from 
informational asymmetries, but has opened up risks of regulatory and informational capture, and 
regulatory inertia. An alternative reform agenda, based on a strategic engagement with these 
trade-offs, is suggested here, which involves relocating code governance into the public sphere, 
not to Ofgem, but rather to a dedicated codes management body. 
 
 
1. Energy industry codes and code governance in Britain 
 
To obtain a licence to operate in the gas or electricity sectors in Great Britain, companies are 
obliged to become party to, and comply with, the relevant industry codes and related technical 
standards.
1
 The ten main codes are shown in Table 1. Table 2 shows which type of industry actor 
is required to sign up to which of these codes. The Grid Code and the Distribution Code can be 
considered as ‘technical’ codes, while the others are primarily commercial.  
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 It is possible for companies to depart from what is specified in codes and standards, but to do so, they must seek 
derogations. There are de minimis exemptions for small generators. However for distribution and supply licences 
there are no exemptions. 
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Energy industry codes are detailed multilateral agreements that define the commercial and 
technical terms under which participants can access networks and operate in markets. Along with 
related technical standards, codes set rules for a large range of practices in the gas and electricity 
system, including: terms of access and connection to networks; charging methodologies; network 
planning and operation; data reporting and management; requirements, and rewards and 
penalties in the balancing mechanism. They are a key but often overlooked element in the 
governance of energy. 
 
Crucially, for any aspect of energy policy to function well in practice, the relevant codes must be 
aligned with that policy (CMA 2015c). Central to this issue is code governance. Codes are living 
documents and are frequently changed, or modified. Each code has some form of panel or board 
which ‘owns’ the code and is responsible for overseeing the modification process. These panels 
are made up of representatives of industry groups (for example, network operators, different 
classes of generators, suppliers, etc.) and, in some panels, independents and representatives of 
consumers. All codes also have an administrator body to maintain the codes and support the code 
modification process on a day-to-day basis. 
 
A modification (or ‘mod’) to a code is usually proposed by any party to the code, and in some 
cases, certain named outside bodies as well.
2
 Since 2008, the modification process has then been 
split into three tracks (Table 3). One is for minor modifications with ‘non-material’ impacts on 
code parties, which are handled entirely by industry on a ‘self-governance’ route. The 
assessment of the proposal is managed by the panel. Each code has its own specific procedure, 
although there are some common elements including referral to specialist work-groups for 
assessment of complex modifications and industry consultation on options. In some codes, 
alternative proposals or variants can also be raised by other parties. Panels then adopt or reject 
the modification. 
 
The second track is for modifications that have more major consequences for parties. These are 
handled in the manner described above for the self-governance route, except that panels cannot 
decide on the modification themselves but rather make recommendations to approve or reject,
3
 
with the final decision made by Ofgem.
4
 
 
Third, where Ofgem takes the view that policy change and the carrying out of its duties require 
it, the regulator itself can instigate a Significant Code Review (SCR) process. Up until further 
reforms this year (see below) Ofgem could prepare the ground by carrying out analysis of 
changes needed and their likely impacts, but could not raise a modification itself; instead it 
would have to direct a licensee to do so on its behalf. As with an ordinary modification, Ofgem 
retains final decision powers. 
 
2. Issues in code governance 
 
Aspects of the codes governance system have long been seen as problematic. Concerns fall into 
three areas: complexity and fragmentation, dominance by incumbents, and the ability of the 
system to respond to energy system transformation. 
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 Codes can also be changed directly as a result of legislation, although this does not happen very frequently. An 
example would be changes made to the main electricity codes following the 2013 Energy Act, which brought the 
Electricity Market Reforms into effect. 
3
 In the DCUSA recommendations are reached by voting by parties. 
4
 Formally speaking by Ofgem’s governing body, the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority. 
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2.1 Complexity and fragmentation 
 
The British energy code system is highly complex and fragmented, and has thus far proven 
resistant to rationalisation or consolidation. The total number of pages of code and other licence 
documentation runs to over 10,000 (Good Energy 2015), with some individual codes being in 
excess of 1,000 pages.
5
 The large number of codes adds to costs
6
 and duplication, especially 
where changes cut across multiple codes, because of a lack of coordination across codes (Ofgem 
2014a). While there are some core common elements, each code has separate ICT requirements, 
process rules, reporting arrangements, and credit and collateral arrangements, which also change 
frequently. In the last area, Cornwall Energy (2014) argues that it is difficult for new entrants to 
accurately assess the implications of credit arrangements on the costs of entry, and changes in 
rules can have distributional impacts that are difficult to quantify (Cornwall Energy 2014). Since 
collateral requirements are related to the perceived risk of default, new (typically smaller) 
entrants face higher requirements than do larger well-established companies. 
 
The fixed costs of compliance are disproportionately high for smaller actors. Just keeping up 
with modifications to codes and other licence conditions is a significant activity – there have 
been 241 proposed modifications to the CUSC since 2001, 275 to the UNC since 2005, and 327 
to the BSC since 2010. One major supplier maintains a spreadsheet with over 3,000 line-items to 
ensure compliance, and according to one account a typical Big 6 utility would have a team of 30 
people solely working on compliance (Ecotricity 2015). 
 
Beyond compliance, effective involvement in the code change process requires technical 
expertise and significant resource. Ofgem estimates that there are around 150 code panel-type 
meetings a year, and on average each modification proposal may require around four working 
groups, with more complex changes needing more (CMA 2015a: 8). While all codes share the 
basic processes of developing, drafting, consulting and reaching recommendations on 
modifications, each is different in its details (Lockwood et al 2015). There are different rules 
about who can raise modification proposals and about raising alternate proposals once a 
modification has been tabled. Some codes have standing work groups, while others (for example 
the SEC, MRA and SPAA) form ad hoc work groups for specific mods. Formats of reports 
differ; some panels have independent chairs, while others do not. 
 
There is evidence that a disproportionately higher cost of participation in code governance for 
small actors prevents their engagement, and de facto allows larger incumbents to dominate 
(CMA 2015b: 22-24, Ecotricity 2015). The challenge for smaller actors is compounded by the 
variety of governance arrangements across codes, requiring participants: “to master multiple 
processes to understand what stage modifications proposals have reached. They are hard to 
rationalise for even well-resourced players, and confounding to smaller ones” (Cornwall Energy 
2015: 2).  
 
The difficulties faced by smaller code parties in participating in the governance process were one 
of the reasons that Ofgem initiated the 2008 Code Governance Review. This Review brought in 
a Code Administrators Code of Practice (CACoP)
7
 which urged code administrators to be 
‘critical friends’, giving support especially to “under-represented parties, small market 
participants and consumer representatives”(Ofgem 2015d: 4). However, while it appears that the 
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 In hard copy this weighs in at more than 50 kg Chris Welby, Good Energy, personal communication 
6
 British Gas (2015) estimates the cost of code administration across MRA, BSC, DCUSA, UNC, SEC and SPAA for 
2015 at more than £10m. 
7
 Ofgem (2015d) 
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CACoP has helped smaller actors to some extent, it is non-binding and in practice it has been 
unevenly applied and an insufficient measure overall (Good Energy 2015, Cornwall Energy 
2015, IGov 2015). Oversight of code administrator performance in relation to the CACoP also 
appears to be weak (EDF 2015). More fundamentally, governance of code administrators seems 
almost absent (CMA 2015c: 465), and Ofgem has limited powers to direct them or sanction them 
for poor performance against the CACoP objectives.
8
 
 
A final concern is that the complexity and fragmentation of the codes system make it more costly 
and difficult for the regulator to exercise its veto over modification decisions in an effective way. 
Ofgem currently makes around 100 decisions a year on modifications, drawing on expertise from 
across the organisation.
9
  However, the complexity of codes is such that there are gaps where the 
regulator is at a disadvantage relative to industry and where external expertise is required. Ofgem 
has powers under licences to request information from industry, but there is a tendency for this 
information to be presented in ways that favours its sources. 
 
2.2 Dominance by incumbents 
 
As noted above, the power to draft code modifications remains largely in the hands of industry. 
An important issue therefore is the degree to which this process is dominated by large 
incumbents. The issue of incumbent dominance has several possible dimensions. First, there is 
the simple issue of who is on the bodies governing the codes. The details of processes for 
determining membership of code Panels or Boards varies, but they generally involve a mix of 
elections from amongst industry parties (sometimes structured by type of company i.e. networks, 
suppliers, large and small generators etc.), and the appointment of independent individual experts 
and a consumer representative. Some small suppliers argue that working groups and to some 
extent code panels are dominated by incumbents (CMA 2015b: 22, Cooperative Energy 2015: 2). 
However, the CMA (2015c: 464) disagrees, taking the view that “current representation of 
industry participants on code panels, in the light of the nature of each code, achieves a fair 
balance.” 
 
Table 4 shows the make-up of the main governing body of each code in late 2015. Between 8% 
and 50% of these bodies are made up of members who are employed by one of the Big 6 
utilities. However, if the major regulated network companies are also included, then the 
incumbent group has a clear majority of members on all codes except the BSC and the SEC. 
These network companies are of course incumbents in a special sense, as they are not exposed to 
competition in the normal way. Nevertheless, it is arguable that they have a vested interest in the 
maintenance of the current situation. Beyond the bodies at the apex of the governance system 
there are also work groups and sub-committees where much of the detailed analysis is done, and 
the basis laid for decisions. Here, incumbents tend to predominate more clearly because resource 
constraints mean that smaller actors often do not have the expertise and time needed (CMA 
2015b, DCRP 2015).  
 
There is also some ambiguity about what industry representatives on code panels and work 
groups are actually representing. In some codes they are supposed to be independent, furthering 
the efficiency of the codes system rather than the interests of the particular companies they work 
for, but it is unclear how this is policed and, according to Good Energy (2015: 6), this is rarely 
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 There is also a particular question about potential conflicts of interest from the fact that National Grid is at one and the same 
time an industry actor with interests in electricity transmission and gas transmission and distribution, and administrator of the 
CUSC, as well as the BSC via Elexon (which is owned by National Grid) (RWE npower 2015). 
9
 Interview with senior official, Ofgem, 7 January 2016 
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the case in practice.  Some code parties take the view that in practice panel and work group 
members typically play a dual role, one involving collective responsibility for efficient and 
effective working of the Code, and the other keeping an eye on how modifications will affect the 
commercial interests of their own companies (IGov 2015). 
 
Examples of what appears to be the operation of incumbent bias can be found in code 
modifications. Cooperative Energy (2015) cites DCUSA mod DCP178, in which some 
distribution network owners (DNOs) sought to recover deferred revenue owed from 2013 from 
suppliers based on their current market share, as opposed to market share in 2013. Since the 
market share of smaller suppliers has grown since 2013, this decision subsidises the large 
incumbents at the expense of independents. Another example might be BSC P272 on mandatory 
settlement for half-hourly metered consumers raised by Smartest Energy, which was rejected by 
the panel (although subsequently revived by Ofgem). However, there are also examples, 
especially from the BSC panel (which has a higher proportion of independents than other panels) 
where final recommendations supported the position of smaller companies (Lockwood et al 
2015). 
 
2.3 A gap between code objectives and policy objectives 
 
Most commercial codes were established in the 1990s following privatisation, while the 
technical codes have their origins in the pre-privatisation post-War period. They were originally 
designed for a limited range of types of technologies, scales and institutional arrangements. The 
challenge for codes governance is that all of these aspects of the system are now changing, and 
the next ten years is likely to see a major transformation in the way energy is produced and used 
with a far deeper penetration of intermittent renewables, decentralised energy and a much greater 
role for demand side flexibility. 
 
However, while the current code governance framework is well-suited to delivering incremental 
improvement, it does not readily support strategic or transformational change of the type that 
will be needed (IET 2014, CMA 2015a, Ofgem 2015). One issue is coordination of multiple 
modifications across codes. For example, to have a well-functioning market for demand side 
response, changes to a number of codes and related standards will be required, including the 
DCUSA, the D-Code, Engineering Regulations P2/6, the BSC and the CUSC (Lockwood 2014). 
Moreover, many relevant groups, including manufacturers of meters, electric vehicles and 
charging equipment, the ICT sector, the home and building automation industry, aggregators, 
end users and community energy groups, which are currently excluded from the technical 
electricity codes will have to be brought into the system (IET 2015). Yet, while code 
administrators do communicate with each other, no single body is responsible for addressing 
major changes that cut across codes under current arrangements. 
 
More fundamentally, the objectives against which code modifications are formally judged differ 
from the policy objectives of government. Code governance objectives still focus purely on 
ensuring effective competition, cost-reflexivity and consistency with European regulation. They 
do not include social and environmental goals.
10
 Ofgem does take its remit (which was amended 
over the 2000s several times to strengthen the element of sustainable development) into account 
when deciding whether to reject or accept recommendations, but this comes very late in the 
process, and is both an ineffective and inefficient way of fitting code governance to this remit. 
There is also a concern, voiced especially by consumer representatives, that the lack of an 
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 The sole exception is the new Smart Energy Code, which does have an explicit objective to facilitate innovation for a secure 
and sustainable energy system. 
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explicit consumer welfare objective means that panels can make recommendations without 
proper consideration of potential impacts of modifications on consumers (Citizens Advice 2015).  
This situation means that it is effectively impossible to get panels to recommend modifications 
for the direct purpose of furthering the interest of consumers and improving sustainability.
11
 
 
These problems are not new; they helped drive the first Code Governance Review in 2008 
(GEMA 2008) and were identified at the time as a “fundamental flaw” in code governance 
(Brattle Group/Simmons and Simmons 2008: 5). The main response was the introduction of the 
Significant Code Review mechanism (see above). So far there have been four SCRs, covering 
gas security of supply, electricity balancing arrangements, electricity transmission charging and 
faster switching. 
 
However, a number of problems with the SCR process have emerged. The first, as noted above, 
is Ofgem’s limited capacity in the area of codes, with the result that it has sometimes struggled 
to specify what it wants from an SCR in an effective way (Cornwall Energy 2015). Another 
problem is that Ofgem could not impose a modification itself (CMA 2015c: 468). It could 
possibly choose to impose mandatory timetables for the development of modification proposals 
within licence conditions but has chosen not to do so. Another issue is that SCRs are taking 
much longer to undertake than was originally envisaged, with the first three reviews taking 
between 32 and 44 months (Ofgem 2015a: 7). Citizen’s Advice (2015: 2) argue that: ‘While the 
SCR process appears to have been intended to allow the regulator to grab important issues by the 
scruff of the neck and drag them forward, its practical effect has been the opposite with these 
project conspicuously lacking momentum and making very slow progress’. Ofgem can do 
preparatory analysis, but a separate round of analysis is subsequently undertaken within the 
modification process, running the risk of duplication. There is no incentive for parties to raise or 
identify problems early on, and they arise late in the process, sometimes leading to situations 
where Ofgem ends up rejecting proposals that it instigated itself.
12
 
3. Recent reforms of the code governance system 
 
As discussed above, Ofgem undertook a review of code governance in 2008 which led to the 
introduction of the Significant Code Review and the CACoP. Further reform has come back on 
the policy agenda in two ways: one within the energy market investigation conducted by the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and another in a further review of code governance 
by Ofgem. 
 
The CMA investigation concluded in 2016 that the conflicting commercial interests of code 
parties, their limited incentives to deliver policy changes and Ofgem’s insufficient ability to 
influence the code modification process all created an adverse effect on competition (CMA 
2016). The Authority had initially proposed reforms that granted Ofgem more powers to project-
manage and/or control the timetabling of code changes (CMA 2015c). However, following a 
number of criticisms from industry actors and code administrators, these proposals were 
amended to more limited reforms in three areas  (CMA 2016: 730-31): 
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 For example, when a small wind farm operator proposed a change to the CUSC to give guaranteed connection 
and priority access to renewable generators (CAP148) in 2007, it was rejected because while it was intended to 
support wider government policy on renewables the panel did not believe it would support the narrower 
economic efficiency objectives of the CUSC (Brattle Group/Simmons and Simmons 2008). Davenport (2008) gives 
further similar examples.  
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 Citizen’s Advice (2015) cite the example of BSC P304 and P314 on incentives for balancing  
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 Strategic Direction – new responsibilities for Ofem to produce an annual strategic 
direction and work plans, laying out how codes need to be changed to match policy 
change, and the creation of a ‘consultative board’ which would consider cross-cutting 
code issues. 
 
 Powers of initiation – new powers for code administrators and Ofgem to initiate and 
prioritise code changes in order to meet the strategic direction, a new backstop ‘call-in’ 
power for Ofgem to bring under its control any change process it deemed of strategic 
importance. These powers would effectively substitute for the existing SCR powers. 
 
 Licensing of code administrators – to harmonise code administration and allow Ofgem to 
monitor performance against objectives set in licences 
 
Ofgem launched its own further review of code governance in May 2015 (Ofgem 2015a). Again, 
some initial proposals, such as the requirement for all codes panels to have an independent chair, 
were dropped following industry consultation. The final proposals for reform from this review 
include three main elements (Ofgem 2016): 
 
 Significant Code Reviews – new powers for Ofgem to raise a modification following an 
SCR process, and to lead an entire end-to-end process of development and modification 
itself.  
 
 Self-governance – making self-governance the default option for non-significant 
modifications. 
  
 Code administration – a number of changes strengthening expectations of code 
administrators and panels, including forward work plans and increased cross-code 
coordination through a modification proposals register, and the requirement that every 
code change proposal form should have a section on consumer impacts.  
 
It should be noted that both of these reviews were limited in scope. The CMA review was 
limited by the terms of reference of the wider energy market investigation, with a relatively 
narrow focus on competition and harm to current consumers. The Ofgem 2015 review explicitly 
considers only relatively minor changes to the framework set up by the earlier 2008 Code 
Governance Review. 
 
More importantly, however, these reforms have been piecemeal and incremental in nature, 
responding to individual problems within code governance rather than engaging with its 
fundamental structure. It is likely that, just as was the case with reforms emerging from the 2008 
CGR, these latest changes to code governance will not address the chronic problems with code 
governance outlined above. 
 
We argue that to develop an alternative reform agenda, it is necessary to have a clearer analytical 
framework for understanding the nature of code governance and the trade-offs involved in its 
design. The next section develops both such a framework and the consequent agenda. 
 
4. An alternative approach 
4.1 A theoretical framework 
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The CMA describes energy code governance as “a domain of limited industry self-regulation 
within the wider regulatory framework” (CMA 2015c: 457). However, conventional self-
regulation involves companies organising their own rules, with the threat of regulation if 
outcomes are not sufficiently in the public interest (Bartle and Vass 2007). By contrast, code 
governance involves (mainly) companies writing rules which, subject to the veto of the regulator, 
then become regulation with the force of public authority behind it. It is thus perhaps better 
described as self-authored regulation. 
 
This arrangement involves a double delegation of regulatory initiative, first from the government 
to Ofgem, and then from Ofgem to industry. As with all delegations there are several potential 
rationales (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002), but here two predominated. The first is to minimise 
regulatory risk, by making code modification subject to the control of industry actors and 
preventing the regulator from enforcing arbitrary changes.
13
 In theory this should reduce the cost 
of capital and ultimately benefit consumers. A second rationale was informational efficiency 
(Huber and Shipan 2002; Flinders 2008), based on an argument of information asymmetry and 
the implication that industry actors would be speedier and more flexible in setting and changing 
rules, and such rules would be more practicable and more effectively policed (Gunningham and 
Rees 1997). 
 
Code governance can therefore be seen as built on a set of specific principles for institutional 
design. However, there are limits to the efficacy of institutional design for a number for reasons, 
including the fact that institutions have multiple effects, the likelihood of unanticipated effects, 
and changes to the wider policy environment (Pierson 2004). Institutions can also reflect and 
maintain inequalities of power “by facilitating the organization of certain groups while actively 
disarticulating others” (Thelen 2002: 92, see also Pierson 2000). These factors raise the 
possibility that an institutional design based on delegation may entail certain costs or trade-offs 
(Flinders 2008: 50). We would argue that there are three areas of particular importance: 
regulatory capture, informational capture and regulatory inertia. 
4.1.1 Regulatory capture 
 
Self-authored regulation involves a relatively high degree of independence of industry from 
government, but as independence increases so does the risk of regulatory capture (Shleifer 2005, 
Wren-Lewis 2011). In code governance, industry drafting of regulation involves a high degree of 
de facto control over the decision-making context, stability of arrangements (avoiding the costs 
of continuous lobbying), and the use of the monopoly powers of public authority, thus going far 
beyond attempts at simply influencing the regulatory process (Mitnick 2011). The risks of 
distortion are potentially very strong.  
 
In the context of code governance, it is unlikely that any single company will manage to extract 
rent purely for itself through a code change, since it faces all the other companies directly in the 
modification process. Rather, the concern is that incumbents will collude to use code governance 
effectively to make entry by potential competitors more costly and difficult, as suggested by 
Stigler (1971). As outlined above, the record on the complexity and fragmentation of codes, and 
the dominance of incumbents on working groups and panels, suggests that, at best, these 
incumbents have allowed the evolution of the system to work in their favour. 
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 The property rights of industry actors are already protected to a degree through licences, which are legally 
enforceable contracts (Newbery 1999). However, licences can also be revoked if conditions – of which codes make 
up a crucial part – are not met, so codes determine the terms on which property rights are secured. 
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The risks of capture may be reduced by the representation of other interests, including those of 
consumers, within the process (Wren-Lewis 2011). The issue here is one of balance of 
representation; where panels do have consumer representation there is only one representative, 
with limited resources. Risk of capture may also be reduced if the workings of code governance 
are transparent to government and citizens. Conversely if these workings are more transparent to 
incumbents, then the risk of capture is greater. The technical complexity and fragmentation of 
the governance system here works strongly in favour of incumbents. 
4.1.2 Informational capture 
 
The regulator holds a veto power over proposed modifications, which is in part designed to act as 
a check on capture of the modification process. However, this check will only be effective if the 
regulator has sufficient expertise and information to judge effectively whether rule-writing 
powers are being abused or not, and here the regulator faces the problem of informational 
asymmetry (which was one of the arguments for delegation) (Flinders 2008, Baldwin et al 2012). 
The more that the regulator has to depend on industry itself for analysis and information the 
higher the risk of ‘informational capture’ (Wren-Lewis 2011), involving partial, selective or 
misleading representation. The more complex an area of activity, the more difficult this is likely 
to be (McCarty 2013). Again, the complexity and fragmentation described above means that 
there is a strong risk of informational capture in the codes governance system.  
4.2.2 Regulatory inertia 
 
A third problem may arise when institutions do not respond to changes in the wider context 
(Pierson 2004: 119-120). The codes governance system in Britain was designed for conditions of 
technological and institutional stability, with a focus on economic efficiency, but the challenge is 
that the energy system is now facing a period of rapid and fundamental transformation.
14
 Here 
there is a potential trade-off between independence and inertia, or as Newbery (1999) puts it, 
between durability and stability on the one hand and flexibility and adaptability on the other.  
 
Independence of decision making, along with formal remits that are hard to change, is built in to 
the design of regulatory frameworks precisely to protect regulators against the potentially 
changing agendas of future governments. However, the disadvantage of such arrangements is 
that it can create regulatory inertia when wider policy goals, or other aspects of the environment 
such as technology costs, change (Faure-Grimaud and Martimort 2003). Inertia would appear to 
be almost inevitable in the case of the codes governance system, partly because incumbents have 
few incentives to drive through modifications needed for transformational change, and partly 
because wider policy goals are not sufficiently represented in code objectives. 
 
4.2 A reform agenda 
 
The framework developed above makes it clear that many of the problems of the code 
governance system have their roots in the principle of self-authored regulation. The history of 
code governance reform, both in 2008 and in the more recent CMA and Ofgem reviews, is a 
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 As one supplier put it recently, the content of codes “was created at the dawning of the energy market when big 
power stations and big companies dominated. Little of it anticipated a world where decentralised technologies 
such as wind and solar would be producing 24% of the UK’s electricity.” (Julia Davenport quoted in Good Energy 
Press release on the CMA inquiry, 7 July 2015, http://www.goodenergy.co.uk/press/releases/2015/07/01/ceo-
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series of small steps moving slowly away from this principle. However, these steps have been 
piecemeal and unsatisfactory, in part because they have not addressed the principle explicitly.   
 
Our starting point for an alternative approach is that there is a need to move away from self-
authored regulation in a strategic way. The costs of this institutional design principle are 
considerable. At the same time, there is little evidence that departures from the principle to date 
have raised the cost of capital. Had the introduction of SCRs in 2010 increased regulatory risk, 
one would have expected to see the cost of capital for network companies rising after that date. 
The actual cost of capital for companies is commercially confidential, but on the basis of 
Ofgem’s allowances for the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), which are set through 
extensive research and consultation with financial markets, the reverse is in fact true. The 
allowed WACC has fallen steadily from above 5% for price controls in the mid-2000s to under 
4% by 2014.
15
 
 
This move would involve relocating code governance, including the proposing and development 
of modifications, out of the hands of industry and into a body within the public sphere. Variants 
of this type of arrangement already exist in a range of contexts, including the energy sector in the 
US, Norway, Northern Ireland, Australia, Finland and Denmark, as well as UK rail and UK 
postal services (Brattle Group/Simmons and Simmons 2008).  
 
However, even the limited increases in the scope of Ofgem’s powers to steer or manage the code 
change process through Significant Code Reviews (SCRs) have met with opposition from 
industry, based mainly on the same arguments originally put forward for self-authored 
regulation, i.e. increased regulatory risk and the lack of codes expertise in the regulator.
16
 At the 
most basic level, the concern is that a public body that is able to write and adopt code changes 
itself is both ‘judge and jury’. Issues arise at three stages in the process: the initiation of code 
change, the process of code change, and the right of appeal. A credible proposal to relocate code 
governance into the public sphere needs to engage with these arguments. 
4.2.1 Initiating code changes 
 
Here the concern is about short-term political pressures and “the need to do something” leading 
to “inappropriate” interventions (e.g. E.On 2008). Crucial for avoiding these would be a legal 
requirement to show clear and transparent links between major code changes and policies. Code 
change would effectively be part of a policy delivery function. A body in the public sphere 
managing code change would also need to have a mandate that was rule-based but clearly linked 
to specific policy decisions, rather than general powers, to help reduce regulatory risk. 
4.2.2 The process of code change  
 
A second fear is that code governance located in a public body would lead a flawed process, 
without consultation.
17
 To counter this, code change led by a public body would need to include 
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 See the submissions at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/code-governance-review-major-policy-reviews-
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 There are in fact incentives for government to ensure a good process for code change. The first is that in the 
absence of a robust and transparent process that is properly followed, the government is open to Judicial Review 
(As currently happens: RWE recently undertook Judicial Review of a decision on transmission charging, but lost in 
July 2015). The second is that government fears disruption and a collapse in investment in the energy sector even 
more than does the industry, so it has a strong interest in making code changes that work effectively. 
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a robust and transparent consultation and decision-making process, laid out in statute. Possible 
major code reviews would ideally be signalled as far ahead as possible, somewhat along the lines 
of the strategic work plans proposed by the CMA and Ofgem. 
 
There is also a concern that even a well-intentioned public body leading code change may 
impose misconceived code changes, or changes with unintended consequences, because they do 
not understand the detailed working of the industry.
18
 Here, credibility and effectiveness can 
only be established over time by ensuring that a body in the public sphere making changes to 
codes does in fact have the necessary knowledge and expertise. 
 
Under the recent reforms discussed above, Ofgem is currently proposing to undertake more code 
changes by expanding its powers within the Significant Code Review process. However, we 
would argue that Ofgem is not the appropriate public body in which to locate code governance. 
Ofgem is a large organisation with multiple responsibilities and limited resources. As discussed 
above, it already sometimes struggles to exercise its veto in an informed way. The CMA argues 
that it has engaged with code change in an isolated, reactive and piecemeal fashion, and does not 
have the incentive to devote significant resource to “systematically developing its knowledge 
and understanding of the substantive provisions set out in codes” (CMA 2016: A10.4-4). Ofgem 
itself has suggested to the CMA that “as an economic regulator it is not efficient or effective for 
it to lead on the delivery and/or take a prominent role in drafting and implementing detailed and 
often technical code change in an on-going basis.”  
  
It is therefore more appropriate that a new code management body with dedicated resource and 
expertise be created. Such a body is likely to require capacity across a range of expertise, 
including a detailed knowledge of existing codes, electricity markets and networks, including 
supplier-consumer relationships and consumer behaviour; detailed knowledge of new and 
emerging areas and technologies; relevant legal expertise; analysis of economic impact; energy 
systems analysis; an understanding of IT, and project management. 
 
There are other reasons for locating powers to manage code change in a new body rather than in 
Ofgem. Separating economic regulation (which involves Ofgem in particularly close 
relationships with network companies) and code governance would therefore be desirable. 
Finally, by removing Ofgem completely from the upstream end of the code governance process, 
it can then play the role of monitoring compliance with licence conditions. 
 
There are also arguments for a dedicated code management body taking on the current functions 
of the code administrators. A single body would facilitate better coordination of cross-code 
changes and allow for the standardisation and simplification of the current range of different 
practices, collateral requirements etc., where beneficial, all of which would help support smaller 
actors. There could be a single point of contact and website, plus basic steps such as the accurate 
translation of code requirements and code change proposals from legal and technical language 
into plain English, and the provision of ‘one-stop shop’ guidance to what parts of the code 
landscape an actor actually needs to pay attention to. This approach does open up the danger of 
the creation of silos in what becomes a larger organisation than any of the existing code 
administrators. This issue would have to be addressed through writing in the prevention of 
siloing into the core strategy of the body, and linking it to performance indicators and, crucially, 
incentives for staff. 
                                                     
18
 RWE npower (2015) cites the example of Project Nexus, where it considers that Ofgem set unrealistic milestones because it 
did not sufficiently understand the complexities of IT change. Another example would be the electricity balancing SCR, where it 
was only once the mod had gone through the BSC process that it became clear that what Ofgem wanted might have anti-
competitive implications. 
12 
 
4.4.3 The right of appeal 
 
Finally, industry incumbents are concerned that any move away from self-governance to 
regulator-led or publicly-led code governance should be balanced by a robust right of appeal by 
individual companies or actors, although this should be seen as a last resort. Under the Energy 
Act 2004, code decisions can be appealed to the Competition and Markets Authority. This could 
simply be continued. 
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Table 1 
Main energy industry codes and standards in Great Britain 
 
Area Title Description 
Electricity 
distribution 
Distribution Code (D-Code) Technical parameters relating to the planning and use of 
electricity distribution networks 
Distribution Connection and Use 
of System Agreement (DCUSA) 
Covers commercial aspects of use of electricity 
distribution network services 
Electricity 
transmission 
Connection and Use of System 
Code (CUSC) 
Framework for connection and use of high voltage 
transmission system and certain balancing services 
Grid Code Technical aspects relating to connections, operation & 
use of transmission network 
System Operator/Transmission 
Code (STC) 
Defines the relationships between National Grid as 
system operator and transmission   
owners  
Electricity 
balancing 
Balancing and Settlement Code 
(BSC) 
Sets out rules for participating in Balancing Mechanism 
and for settling energy imbalance 
Electricity 
retailing 
Master Registration Agreement 
(MRA) 
Rules for retail market processes including electricity 
registration, change of supplier processes and the Green 
Deal 
Gas transmission 
and distribution 
Unified Network Code (UNC) Defines the rights and responsibilities for users of the 
gas transportation systems, and provides for all system 
users to have equal access to transportation services 
Gas retailing Supply Point Administration 
Agreement (SPAA) 
Sets out the inter-operational arrangements between gas 
suppliers and transporters in the UK retail market 
Gas and 
electricity smart 
metering 
Smart Energy Code (SEC) Defines the rights and obligations of energy suppliers, 
network operators and other relevant parties involved in 
the end to end management of smart metering in Great 
Britain. 
Source: Licences, Code and Standard documents 
 
Table 2 
Code requirements under standard licence conditions, by type of licence 
 
 D-
Code 
DCUSA CUSC Grid 
Code 
STC 
 
BSC MRA UNC SEC 
Electricity Transmission     X X    
Distribution X X X X  X X   
Interconnection X  X X  X    
Generation X X X X  X    
Supply X X X   X X   
Gas Transporter        X  
Interconnector        X  
Shipper        X  
Supplier       X X  
Both Smart Meter 
Communication Licence 
        X 
Source: Licence Standard Conditions documents 
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Table 3 
Alternative modification processes from the Code Governance Review 2008 
 
Modification procedure  Initiation Development  Decision  Implementation  
Self-governance (fast-track 
and regular)  
Industry  Industry  Industry  Industry (network owner)/ code 
administrator  
Ordinary  Industry  Industry  Ofgem  Industry (network owner)/ code 
administrator  
SCR  Ofgem  Ofgem first then 
industry  
Ofgem  Industry (network owner)/ code 
administrator  
Source: CMA (2015c: 467) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Code Panels/Boards 
Number of members by category, October 2015 
 
 MRA BSC DCUSA CUSC D Code Grid code SPAA UNC SEC 
VI supplier- generator 2 1 2 4 3 3 4 2 2 
Network company 1 2 3 2
b
 6 10 2 5 2 
Other Code rep. 1 0 0 0 0 2
c
 0 0 0 
Other supplier 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 
Other generator 0 1 1 2 1 3 0 0 0 
Other network 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Independent 0 8
a
 0 2
a
 3
a
 2 0 1 4 
Consumer rep. 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
d
 
Total 4 12 6 11 15 20 8 12 11 
% VI 50% 8% 33% 36% 20% 15% 50% 17% 18% 
% VI + network 75% 25% 83% 55% 60% 65% 75% 58% 36% 
Independent  chair No Yes No Yes No No No Yes No 
 
Source: Code websites, SSE (2015) 
Notes:  
Excludes secretaries and GEMA members 
a Includes one independent working for Energy UK 
b Only one network rep. is allowed to vote on a given issue 
c Includes Irish SO rep. 
d Currently vacant 
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